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Self-Destructing Encrypted Note

Self-Destructing Encrypted Note

One-time AES-256 encrypted links — ciphertext and key ride in the URL fragment, never on a server

Write a secret note

Examples

Wi-Fi handoff

Input
Note: the guest Wi-Fi password · no password
Output
Link …?n=…#k=… — readable exactly once

After the read, the address bar no longer contains the key.

About this tool

One-time encrypted messages with a visible mechanism: the ciphertext rides in the query string, the key rides in the URL fragment (#k=…) — and browsers never send fragments to servers. Opening the link wipes the fragment from the address bar, reveals the note on demand, and blocks re-decryption in that browser.

An optional password entangles its derived key material into the fragment key, so a leaked link alone is mathematically useless. The burn is honestly scoped: anyone who copied the full link holds the key too — the tool says so instead of pretending.

How to use this tool

  1. Write the message

    Type the one-time secret; add a password for two-factor delivery.

  2. Generate the link

    Encryption is local; the key goes only into the link's fragment.

  3. Share securely

    Send the full link over a trusted channel — fragment and password together open it.

  4. Read once

    The recipient reveals the note; the fragment is gone and re-reading is blocked.

Use cases

One-time credentials

Codes and passwords that shouldn't live in chat scrollback forever.

Time-limited instructions

Instructions that self-destruct after the first read.

Common mistakes

Mistake:Treating burn as DRM

Fix:Anyone who copied the full link before opening can read it too; the burn protects against casual re-reading, not everything.

Mistake:Sending the link and password in the same message

Fix:Split channels: link by chat, password by voice.

Frequently asked questions

How does the note self-destruct?

The decryption key lives only in the link's #fragment. When the recipient opens it, the fragment is wiped from the address bar and a browser flag blocks re-reading. Without the fragment, the ciphertext in the link is undecryptable.

Can the server read my note?

No — and that's the point of the fragment. Browsers never send #fragments in HTTP requests, so any server that hosts or forwards the link only ever sees the encrypted payload.

Is 'burn after reading' a guarantee?

It's a strong best-effort, honestly scoped: within the reader's browser the note won't decrypt twice. But anyone who copied the complete link before opening it holds the key too. Treat it as one-time delivery, not as DRM.

What does the optional password add?

The password's derived key material is XOR-entangled with the fragment key. A leaked link without the password is useless, and the password without the link is useless — an attacker needs both.

References & standards